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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Self-imposed Policy Constraints 
 
The Dutch cannot expand their highway system as they like, because that gets them in 
conflict with European air quality standards; strictly enforcing the latter could also deal a 
death blow to the huge Dutch chicken industry; Germany has to change its returnable can 
system, as it de facto discriminates against foreign beer producers; France can no longer 
resist liberalizing its energy markets; and the Greek government can no longer demand that 
baby food can only be sold in pharmacies. Increasingly national policymakers ‘hit’ against 
the constraints ‘imposed’ on them by the EU. The costs can be high. An, in European eyes, 
illegal detail of the Dutch corporate tax cost the tax office an annual one billion euros in 
income; the European habitat directive prevents the Dutch from drilling for natural gas.  
  European directives, that are largely responsible for such constraints, have - in order 
to become such constraints - to be transposed in national law in the Member-States, on their 
way from laws-in-the-books to laws-in-social-action. Transposition is a necessary 
prerequisite for the subsequent stages of administration, enforcement, and sanctioning. That 
is, transposition is an important form of ‘Europeanization’, of the influence of ‘Europe’ on its 
Member-States.  
  The European constraints on national policy making are in the end of course self-
imposed: by the decision to join the EU, to accept the supremacy of European law, to agree 
on specific directives in Brussels; and by transposing them, as required, in national law. 
However, the hindrances they form for national policy making could increasingly become an 
incentive for resistance. The phase of transposition could offer some opportunities. Will and 
do Member States try to frustrate and delay transposition? And if so, do they do so for 
political reasons? Or is any delay more the result of cumbersome and time consuming 
bureaucratic and political procedures, or perhaps even of lack of attention and priority, or just 
plain inefficiency and sloppiness. Transposition is probably mostly a legal and administrative 
task. However, occasionally there could be a temptation to weave in political desires. Notably 
when transposition hinders national policymaking or when it will not make policymakers 
popular with the general - or a specific, but powerful - public.  
 
 
1.2. Unity via Diversity?  
 
Transposition of directives in national law is a special form of national law-making. It 
follows the decision making processes in the various national political-administrative arenas. 
What is special about this legislative process is that there is very limited room for manoeuver 
for the MS. The content of regulation is to a greater or smaller extent prescribed. For all 
Member-States the input is the same: the directive. So is the required output: a national 
regulation that is in agreement with the directive. What can differ is the throughput: the 
process and form by which the input, the directive, gets translated in output, national 
legislation.      
  That makes the transposition of directives an interesting subject for comparison. All 
Member-States have to transform the same input in more or less similar output. Will the 
throughput differ? The duration and character of the process, and the legal form? If so, this 
should reflect - and hence point the attention to the importance of - differences in national 
political and administrative institutions, such as the legal system, and law making procedures; 
and behind that general, political, legal, and administrative cultures.    4
  Delays there are indeed. Many Member-States don’t succeed to have directives 
transposed within the deadline set by the directive itself. They are over time. In section 2 of 
this paper we present an overview of the scores of five countries - Spain, Greece, the UK, 
Germany, and the Netherlands - as regards the transposition of European directives on food 
quality regulation.  
 
 
1.3. Solving the Riddle 
 
What can explain these delays, and the differences between directives, countries, and over 
time? In section 3 we canvass the already existing literature on transposition for explanations. 
We will find that the variables thus far investigated cannot really do much of the explaining. 
Most of these approaches, and the variables they have chosen to study, have serious 
shortcomings.  
  In section 5 we will offer some alternatives, and here we are being inspired by 
sociological institutionalism. One the one hand we want to focus much more on the process 
of transposition, the required legal procedure as dictated by the national legal instrument 
chosen for transposition, and look only to variables that directly impinge upon this procedure. 
The formal legal procedure is the institutional framework for decision making. Within this 
framework, social actors work on transposition, and in that process they are influenced by 
political interests, but also by role perceptions and informal norms.  
  Furthermore, sociological institutionalism, especially the work of Jim March on 
decision making, has also pointed to the importance of incidental and less rational factors, 
such as the influence of custom and convention as sources of resistance to change, the cycles 
of political priorities, the scarcity of attention, the role of scandals, individual preoccupations 
of central actors, and other incidental factors. That is, we will pay attention to the role of 
structure as against incident in history; and path dependent developments that can and have 
been set off by certain incidents. 
  That brings us to the last topic that we will address: changes over time (section 6). 
Transposition has been a regularly occurring task, and that could have led, one might expect, 
to the development of certain new routines or standard operating procedures to facilitate 
transposition. Is it that countries have learned from past mistakes? Is there a learning curve to 
be perceived? And if so, has this also been influenced by specific incidents in history, that set 
out specific paths? Has this new routinization perhaps also affected the regular procedures for 
policy and law making in the Member-State? I.e. have the formal legal rules of the game been 
changed in the process? 
 
 
1.4. Our Dataset on Food Safety Directives  
 
Most studies on the implementation of European Union directives use data provided by the 
European Commission. There are two major data types used in the studies, depending on how 
‘implementation’ is operationalized. One category of studies focuses on the infringement 
procedures initiated by the Commission for non-compliance as the measurement of 
implementation problems concerning implementation of EU law. Other researchers use the  
Commission’s data on transposition progress that uncover the percentage of the directives not 
yet transposed by the member states. (Haas 1998; Lampinen and Uusikyla 1998; Duina 1999; 
Bursens 2002) This type of data reveals the state of affairs of transposition in countries and in 
policy sectors, but it is silent on the occurrence and length of delays that often happen during   5
the transposition process, at least for a while disturbing the proper functioning of the Internal 
Market.1 
  So far, there is only one dataset that provides  information on the length of 
transposition process, and only for the Netherlands. Mastenbroek (2003) created a database 
with information about the deadline of the directive and the date of adoption, publication and 
entering into force of all known national instruments adopted for transposition in the 
Netherlands. With this data Mastenbroek is able to measure the length of transposition 
process, as well as the occurrence and the length of delays. 
  We have also developed a dataset, that among others includes similar information as 
in Mastenbroek’s database. This dataset covers all food safety directives ever adopted by the 
European institutions – directives currently in force and no longer in force - with a deadline 
before February 1 2004. The total number of directives is 181. The number of directives to be 
transposed differs between the member states, since the selected member states joined the 
European Communities at different times. The Netherlands and Germany had to transpose 
181 directives each, the United Kingdom 171, Greece 127, and Spain 106 directives. The 
total number of cases (transposition of a directive in a member state) is 766. (Annex I, table 
8.) 
  Information on national measures by which directives had been transposed was found 
in three stages. First, the Commission’s database Celex was consulted. This database is 
usually used for finding references to national transposition instruments in member states. 
This database is incomplete and contains sometimes wrong information. In the case of food 
safety directives for the five selected member states, Celex provided references to 74.4 
percent of the national transposition measures. In 4 percent of the cases, the reference was 
incomplete and therefore the national measure could not be found using only Celex. In 21.5 
percent of the cases, Celex provided no information about the national transposition 
instruments. (Annex 1, Table 9.) The comment in these cases was ‘no information available’, 
without further explanation whether that meant that the member state did not need to 
transpose that directive, or whether it was required to do so but had not done it. When 
comparing the missing Celex cases with data found in Commission’s reports or other sources, 
it turned out that in many cases countries had transposed the directives, it was just not 
recorded. Since Celex contains only reference to the national transposition instruments, it was 
necessary to look these up in the libraries or online sources.  
  The second step in the data collection was to consult these reports and other literature 
sources as far as possible. In the food sector, such reports are for our purpose of limited 
value, because they are mostly concerned with practical implementation, instead of 
transposition.  
  Finally, the national legal databases were consulted and the responsible ministries 
were contacted. For the Netherlands2, Spain3 and the UK4 it was possible to find legal 
databases. Of course, they have drawbacks as well, the most common being that the 
information available is limited to a certain period. When we contacted the national ministry 
responsible for transposition, we received in all cases, except for Germany, information about 
the missing implementation measures. This information was not complete either, since the 
ministries normally do not keep records of transposition measures for directives no longer in 
force. In total, information about national transposition instruments was found for 78.4 
                                                 
1 Mastenbroek (2003) revealed that 42 percent of the directives in period of 1995-1998 were transposed late 
in the Netherlands. 
2 Opmaat and Europmaat. 
3 Iberlex 
4 HMSO online and Westlaw.   6
percent of the 874 required transposition cases. For remainder of cases no information could 
be found or the reference was too vague to find the corresponding instrument. (See Annex I,  
table 10) 
  Delays in transposition are calculated by counting how many days passed since the 
deadline of the directive until the first national transposition instrument was adopted. There 
are two reasons for using the first national transposition instrument in analysis. The first is 
that it is difficult to consider when the transposition is completed. If there are several national 
instruments reported to the Commission, one could assume that according to the member 
state the first instrument was not enough in order to comply with a directive. Often this is 
true, indeed. Then the possibility would be to use the last instrument adopted in a country, 
implying that at that point transposition should be complete. However, such an assumption 
would not be correct, as it is possible to find out only the last instrument at a certain point in 
time and not in general. Thus, it is not possible to know when transposition is complete by 
looking at references in Celex or other sources. It is possible that later new measures will be 
adopted, but for calculating delays, the first measure adopted is sufficient. In this way, the 
delays will not be overestimated; the ‘minimum delay’ will be calculated. Second, we think it 
is plausible to assume that the first instrument adopted by a member state introduced the 
largest changes to existing national policy. Therefore, it has faced possible unwillingness 
from the opposition’s side to change the status quo. 
  In cases where only already existing older national instruments were reported, i.e. 
national instruments adopted before the publication of a directive, a note was made in the 
database. Our dataset comprises only 26 such cases (3%). These cases will not be used in the 
analysis. 
 
 
2. Performance: Country-Differences in Delay 
 
The data on our dependent variable ‘delay’ is not normally distributed. Therefore, before 
doing any descriptive analysis, we removed the extreme outlying cases. This is accounted for 
in Annex 2. Thus the following analyses were done with data that excludes the outliers. 
  Delays are calculated as the date of adoption of the first national instrument minus the 
deadline of the directive. Delays were found in a little more than a half of the cases (54.9%) 
(table 1). One directive was transposed exactly on time, and 33% of the directives were 
transposed before the deadline. On the rest of the cases, 12%, information was lacking. 
 
Table 1. Transposition on or over time* 
  
Frequency  Percent  Valid 
Percent 
Delayed  392  54,9  62,3 
On time  1  ,1  ,2 
Too early  236  33,1  37,5 
 
  
  
Total  629  88,1  100,0 
Missing  System**  85  11,9    
Total  714  100,0    
Source: Own data 
* Analysis with outliers included is in Annex 2 table 13 
** Information missing on the deadline of a directive and/or on the national transposition measure. 
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The average delay is 123 days (about 4 months) and the longest delay excluding outliers was 
961 days (almost 3 years) (Annex 2, table 11). Thus, the delays in transposition of food 
directives are rather common and they can be long. 
  Delays differ between the member states. The Netherlands has the best transposition 
record and its mean delay is 56 days (less than 2 months). It is followed by Greece with an 
average delay of  90 days (3 months). The next best transposition record belongs to Spain 
average delay being 132 days (about 4.5 months). The average transposition delay in the UK 
is 155 days (about 5 months). Germany has the worst transposition record – 193 days delay 
on average (about 6.5 months). An interesting thing to note is that although Greece and Spain 
have rather good transposition records concerning the average length of delays, table 2 
reveals that they have the largest percentage of delayed transposition cases. On the other 
hand, Germany, the laggard, does ‘rather well’ if we look at the percentage of delayed 
directives. Thus, it seems, that although Spain and Greece have relatively short transposition 
delays, they happen more often than, for example in Germany, which has less, but longer 
ones. 
 
Table 2. Differences in delays between the member states* 
  Mean delay in days  Total number of directives that needed 
to be transposed in the country 
% of them 
transposed too late 
Netherlands   56  170  42.9 
Greece   90  117  63.2 
Spain   132  103  72.8 
UK   155  163  46.0 
Germany   193  161  59.0 
Average/ Total  123  714  56.8 
Source: Own data 
* After correcting for outlying cases (see Annex 2) 
 
 
3. Explaining the Delay: The Literature on Transposition 
 
3.1. Hypotheses in the Literature 
 
  What could explain these differences in time needed for transposition? Why do some 
countries take much more time than others? And why do some get even in trouble with the 
European Commission in the sense that the latter starts an infringement procedure against 
them for failure to notify transposition, for non-conformity or incorrect application? 
  This question has already concerned quite a few researchers, such as Mbaye 2001 and 
2003, Lampinen and Uusikyla 1998, Guiliani 2003 and 2004, Mastenbroek 2003, Boerzel et 
al 2004, Sverdrup 2004, Heritier 1996, Knill 1998, Knill and Lenschow 1998, Risse et al 
2001, Falkner et al 2002 and 2005.  These authors have tried to link quite a variety of 
variables to transposition deficiencies or infringement procedures. They include political 
attitudes (political unwillingness, domestic opposition or domestic conflict over the 
directive), popular attitudes to the EU, political institutions (power of the state, involvement 
of parliament, stability of government, number of veto-players, consensualism, policy style, 
corporatism), legal and administrative factors (respect for the rule of law, administrative 
capacity, administrative and political culture), and policy content (goodness of fit between 
goals and instruments of directive and national law).   8
  We have taken those studies that used a quantitative approach and identified their 
independent variables, hypotheses, and whether or not they found a significant correlation. 
This overview can be found in Annex III. Table 3 below summarises the results of the 
hypotheses tested by Mbaye (2001), Lampinen and Uusikyla (1998), Giuliani (2003), 
Giuliani (2004), Borzel et al. (2004), Sverdrup (2004), and Mastenbroek (2003). 
 
Table 3. Summary of hypotheses tested to explain transposition deficiencies and/or 
infringement procedures 
Hypotheses  Frequency Percentage 
Confirmed 14  45.2% 
Confirmed, but small explanatory power or weak
relationship 
6 19.3% 
Not confirmed  11  35.5% 
Total  31 100% 
 
The table shows that in a majority of cases the independent variables had no significant 
influence on transposition performance. Some authors have use similar variables but 
operationalized them differently. They got quite different results, sometimes even opposite 
ones for the same variable. For example, Giuliani (2003), Mbaye (2001), and Borzel et al. 
(2004) all test how the presence of veto players in a decision making procedure influence 
compliance with European directives. All authors predict that the more veto players are 
involved, the more problematic is compliance. The hypothesis was confirmed only by one 
study (that of Giuliani). 
  Even when authors find a positive correlation, their variables explain only a minor 
part of the variation. Giuliani (2003) could, with a model that included five variables (year of 
joining the EU, veto players, effective nr. of parties, Shapley index (power index) and 
agenda-setting  power) only explain about 30 percent of the variance (R2=0.295). In a more 
recent and as yet unpublished study Keading (2005) found that 10 of such variables taken 
together could only explain 0.26 of the variance. And, as Steunenberg (in a discussion of the 
Keading paper) noted, some of the independent variables are not quite independent 
observations, i.e. the correlations found are even exaggerated. Anyway, it makes one wonder 
what explains the remaining 0.74 of the variance.  
 
 
3.2. Shortcomings 
 
Although commendable, most of the studies cited suffer from one or more of the following 
problems: 
 
a- The variables are often too broad and not enough focused on the transposition processes. 
Furthermore the authors have been constrained in finding appropriate proxies. The proxies 
for which enough data on all countries could be found - indeed the measurement problems 
can be considerable - are often quite far removed from the variables that they should 
represent. Thus the degree of unionization as a proxy for corporatism is not quite the one that 
would be relevant for the legislative process of transposition. Administrative capacity may be 
important for transposition, but are proxies such as used by Mbaye (tax income as pct GDP, 
performance-related pay of civil servants, general corruption score) not too much a 
characterization of the government as a whole, and less of those (sometimes small) parts 
involved in transposition? What about the number of veto-players as measured by the parties   9
belonging to the government coalition (Guiliani), in case most transpositions are done 
through ministerial decrees of only one minister? Mbaye (2001) and Treib (2003) 
operationalize national veto-players as the number of parties in parliament, but in many 
transposition procedures parliaments are not involved at all. And what could the influence be 
of political culture, as measured a.o. by ‘public satisfaction with democracy’ or ‘post 
materialist values’ (Lampinen and Uusikyla 1998)? What would be here the logic behind the 
hypothesis? Transposition is in most cases a legal-administrative procedure (see below) and 
most of these variables do not - at least not directly - touch upon this world. 
  
b- Many variables can indeed work both ways. There are both arguments why they could 
facilitate or frustrate speedy transposition.  
  Corporatism can - as in any case of policymaking - imply that broad consensus has to 
be build, and that could mean slow, cumbersome and viscous decision making with strong 
interest associations being veto-players. However, it could also mean cooperative and 
consensual relations between major political and administrative actors, which facilitates 
broad based but nevertheless speedy decisionmaking. 
  ‘Administrative capacity’ can mean that a government has the organizational 
infrastructure to aid it in speedy transposition. However, it can also mean that public 
administrations are well-developed bureaucracies with a preference for legal precision and 
lengthy formal procedures which satisfy all demands for legal soundness, and which also 
have already detailed legislation in place where the new ‘foreign’ legal transplant has to be 
fitted in 
 
c- Most researchers seems to be in search for the ‘holy grail’, the one variable that does all, or 
most, of the explaining. Is it political resistance? Is it the power of the member state? Or is it 
administrative impotence, or even incompetence? However, the low variance explanation 
scores indicate that there must be quite a plurality of variables involved. Then it becomes a 
challenge not only to identify these, but to try to disentangle how they are logically related.  
 
d- Furthermore, directives come in many varieties - just like national laws. National 
legislative proposals can experience all kinds of resistance and delay: policy makers may 
oppose for political reasons, administrative lawyers for lack of legal soundness. Variables 
that explain one case, may be irrelevant in another one. Depending on the nature of the 
directive member states may choose different legal instruments for transposition. But that has 
immediately consequences for the political and administrative variables that affect 
transposition. 
 
e- Researchers have been searching for rational explanations. But, as March (1988, 1994) - a 
leading author in sociological institutionalism - emphasized: decision making is often less 
rational that it should be. Decisions often just ‘happen’, rather than that they are ‘made’. Thus 
also less rational explanations have to be taken in consideration. Perhaps we should also 
leave room for accident and incident.  
 
A more refined and detailed approach is needed, which can build upon the work already 
done. This approach should break open the black boxes between the dependent and 
independent variables. Administrative capacity, yes, but what is that precisely? And how can 
it affect transposition? In order to analyze that, we may have to identify more specific sub-
variables under the heading of ‘administrative capacity’. Rather than working with general 
political culture as measured by attitudes of the general public, we should focus on specific   10
cultures, on norms and values of actors involved in transposition, norms and values they may 
have derived from the profession in which they were trained, the tasks they have been given, 
or the administrative organization in which they work. 
  In order to do so it would be useful for students of European integration and 
compliance of Member States to borrow from existing literatures that have only rarely been 
linked to European studies. Europeanists have received most of their theoretical input from 
international relations and comparative political economy. These literatures tend to take 
macro-perspectives on European integration, and often even consider a member state as a 
single actor, without looking into the - huge - black boxes that these member states form. 
Relevant literatures are, apart from the obvious choices European law and comparative law, 
those of comparative public administration, sociology of law, policy making and regulatory 
styles, socio-economic studies, organization studies, the behavioral theory of decision 
making, and sociological theory more in general. 
  Drawing upon these literatures we will in section 5 develop a theoretical model for 
analysis that allows us to look into the ‘black box’ of the legislative decision making process 
that forms the throughput between the input: the directive, and the output: the transposed 
national instrument. Before we do so we present some more findings from our dataset, which 
among others point to the importance of the chosen instrument. This we will take up in 
section 5 as a starting point for our model.  
 
 
4. The Role of Source of Directive and Chosen Instrument  
 
  We tested some quantitative variables with our own dataset. First of all, we 
investigated whether the source of the directive made a difference. By this we mean whether 
the directive was decided by the European Commission, the European Council, or the 
Council and Parliament under the co-decision procedure. Arguments are conceivable both for 
quick and slow transposition of Commission directives.  
  Quick transposition could be due to Commission directives usually being of a more 
technical nature and hence being less controversial and less politicized. Therefore, less 
political resistance should be expected, transposition should be more a technical matter for 
administrators, allowing often for lower-level instruments to be used, and hence easier and 
quicker. However, there is also a logical argument why Commission directives could take 
more time. Member states have not - at least explicitly and directly - been involved in 
deciding them, hence they could be easier considered a ‘foreign’ element, being imposed 
upon the member states. That could produce resistance. By contrast, member states have been 
involved in decision making of Council and Council-Parliament directives. This involvement 
could have increased legitimacy of the directive and commitment of member states to 
transpose them.  
  Table 4 seems first to confirm the first hypothesis: Commission directives experience 
much less delay in transposition, at least for all five countries over the whole period. 
However, joint Council and Parliament directives are transposed even faster, which seems to 
confirm also the second hypothesis: if there is a broad basis of democratic legitimation, 
transposition goes even faster. However, the latter finding may be mediated by the fact that 
the European Parliament got only in recent decades involved in deciding upon directives. 
Hence the ‘good performance’ of Council+Parliament Directives may be also caused by the 
fact that these are more recent, and as we will see, transposition is going faster in the more 
recent decades (see section 6 of this paper). 
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Table 4. Mean delays in days depending on the EU institutions that adopted the directive 
 
Mean delay in 
days  
Commission   78
Council   233
Council and Parliament   -3
Source: Own data 
 
Figure 1.  Mean delay in days in a country/ EU institution that adopted a directive between 
1970-1979 
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Figure 2. Mean delay in days in a country/ EU institution that adopted a directive between 
1980-1989 
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Figure 3. Mean delay in days in a country/ EU institution that adopted a directive between 
1990-1999 
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Figure 4. Mean delay in days in a country/ EU institution that adopted a directive between 
2000-2004 
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  As figures 1 to 4 show, the importance of Commission versus Council(+Parliament) 
changes around 1990. Before that period, Council directives took longer to transpose, except 
in 70-79 in the UK. After 1990 Commission directives needed more time, but again the UK   13
was the exception. The UK went hence in the opposite direction of the other member states. 
  Furthermore, we investigated whether it made a difference if a directive was 
completely new, or whether it was an amendment of an earlier directive. One would expect 
an amendment to be easier and quicker to transpose, because it could most likely be also an 
amendment of earlier national legislation. This is on the whole indeed the case, as table 4 
shows. However, the table shows also a curious north-south divide. In the northern European 
countries Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK an amendment is indeed quicker transposed 
than a completely new directive. In the southern European countries Spain and Greece the 
opposite is the case. There amendments take longer.  As southern countries, especially Spain, 
have been known to use European integration to modernize their societies, it could very well 
be that new directives  - which bring newness and hence modernization - attract more 
attention from policy makers than later amendments, which may be given less priority. 
 
Table 5. Mean delay by country and whether the directive was new or an amendment* 
New directive or amendment of earlier one 
completely new  amendment 
  Mean  N  Mean  N 
Netherlands   100  85  6  85 
Germany   205  83  180  78 
UK   210  84  96  79 
Spain   119  53  146  50 
Greece   59  57  121  60 
Average/ Total  139  362  110  352 
Source: Own data 
* With outliers excluded 
 
  Finally, did the legal instrument the member states selected for transposition matter 
for the length of the delay? The following categories of instruments were used by the various 
member states:  
a- Statutory law, involving the administration, the government, and parliament (NL: wet; D: 
Gesetz; UK: Act of Parliament;) 
b- Orders in Council or Presidential or Royal Decrees, which involve the government as a 
whole (NL: Algemene Maatregel van Bestuur, E: Real Decreto, GR: AD@,*D46` )4VJ"(:")  
c- Ministerial Decisions or Decrees, which are enacted by an individual cabinet minister (NL: 
Ministeriele regeling; D: Verordnung; UK: Regulation, Ordinance, or Statutory instrument; 
E: Orden; GR: KB@LD(46Z "B`N"F0) 
d- other lower-level administrative decisions, such as Orders of Statutory Trade Associations 
(NL), Mitteilungen and Bekanntmachungen (D), or Circulars (UK) 
  Table 5 shows that the type of instrument does indeed make a difference. Ministerial 
decisions are on average 90 days over time, but statutes 275 days and Orders in Council 268 
days.  
  The value of these numbers are however quite limited, as statutory laws were only 
rarely used for transposition in the policy area of food safety regulation. Altogether that 
happened only in 6 out of 630 cases. This is probably because food regulation is an old policy 
field, where already a substantial body of statutory law has been created in the course of time, 
including framework laws that allow the government to use lower-level instruments to 
transpose European directives. The importance of the type of instrument for delays in 
transposition becomes more clear when we compare this policy area with another, that of   14
utility regulation. This is a relatively new policy field: privatization and liberalization of 
energy and telecom markets. Here new basic legislation has yet to be created. Hence laws are 
much more frequently used to transpose directives, as a parallel study by a colleague of us 
(Berglund 2005) shows. 
 
Table 6.  Mean delay by country and by type of national transposition measure* 
type of legal instrument used for transposition 
Statute  Presidential/ 
royal decree 
Ministerial 
decision  Other** 
  
   Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean  N  Mean N 
Netherlands   222  1  191  73  -44  67  -181 14 
Germany   604  3  .     180  118  326 3 
UK   -1  2  .     157  140  . 1 
Spain   .     143  84  75  17  .    
Greece   .     470  3  80  106  .    
Average/ 
Total  275  6  268  160  90  446  72.5 18 
Source: Own data 
* With outliers excluded (see Annex 2) 
* *Category ‘other’ includes the following measures: NL – beschikking, verordening van 
produktschappen, and bekendmaking; D – Mitteilung and Bekanntmachung; UK - Circular 
 
 
5. Towards a Model : Between Structure and Incident 
 
5.1. Sociological Institutionalism 
 
  In this paper we try to understand transposition from the theoretical perspective of 
sociological institutionalism. As most political scientists are not so familiar with sociological 
thinking it may be useful to elaborate a bit on this. A basic assumption of this approach is that 
social actors are embedded in sets of institutions that structure their social action, their 
behavioral choices. Institutions can be defined as formal and informal sets of mutual 
expectations between people, that have become more or less enduring, and that have 
crystallized in rule systems.  
  These rules define roles and identities of social actors, and the criteria for actors to 
take up such roles. The role-definitions are situation specific. They define what is expected of 
oneself and others in specific situations. The same person may meet other expectations (and 
sometimes even different ones from different people) in the classroom, in the street, in a 
singles bar, in church, at a reception with the queen, or on the battlefield. Actors are like 
judges: When they come in new situations they try to identify which rules apply to their 
situation and their own and others’ roles. What is the appropriate behavior here? (C.f. March 
and Olsen 1989 on the logic of appropriateness). What do others expect from them, and what 
can they expect from others? Examples are rules that define social distance (how should one 
address others), but also physical distance in public space (when and where do we queue), 
that define the authority of actors, including the authority to take decisions on behalf of the 
community. Many of these informal rules we follow automatically and unconsciously, once 
we have been socialized in that specific community. We just do things that way, we do not 
think about it. Actually, it would be an enormous burden if we would have to identify all 
these rules consciously and decide whether we want to abide by them or not.    15
  Ideal-typical rule systems are religion, cultural conventions, language, and law. Law 
is actually a formal codification of such mutual expectations as to one another’s behavior, 
developed over a long period of time out of conventions, case law, and formally agreed rules 
(statutory law) and specific for a certain community, society, or country.  
  Rules systems are social facts, in Durkheim’s terminology. They are created by social 
actors in the past, but have acquired a life of their own and govern subsequent generations in 
the same society. They influence our choices, our behavior, but they do not determine them 
completely. Social actors give meaning to their action, and continually interpret and 
reinterpret the rules, in the process changing them, usually gradually and evolutionary, but 
occasionally radically and revolutionary. Language illustrates this well. It is a social product, 
but it cannot be traced back to specific inventors, and has a acquired a life of its own. We get 
socialized in it, live by it, use it, interpret and reinterpret it in use, and gradually change is. 
Revolutionary change is rare, even slight formal changes meet often resistance.  
  Unlike ‘natural facts’ (physical objects like buildings, trees)social facts exist only as 
long as they are socially accepted, as long as a collectivity of people defines them to exist and 
acts on the basis of that: a piece of paper defined and accepted as money (‘trusted’); a statue 
or piece of bread (consecrated wafer) defined as the body of Christ; a sound defined and 
accepted as a word; a rule defined and accepted/observed (difference ‘rule-in-the-books’ and 
‘rule-in-action’). Social actors get also socially defined: their role, duties and rights; their 
trustworthiness, reputation, through naming and shaming. Social facts are related to what 
sociologists call the ‘Thomas theorem’: ‘If people define something as real, it is real in its 
consequences’ 
  Political institutions distribute authority, power, duties, and obligations over roles and 
situations. They regulate access to the political arena, of people, issues, problems, and 
solutions; they distribute resources and legitimacy among participants; they construct the 
physical, cognitive and moral conditions for political action; they influence perceptions of 
political actors of the reality in which they find them, their environment, their tasks; and they 
build a symbolic order for groups, for identification, for meaning.  
  Different social communities have defined different social facts; and often owe their 
identity and cohesion to them: language, religion, myths, symbols, money, codes of honor, 
food standards, more in general culture. There are also differences as regards obedience to 
and sanctioning of norms, trust, etc. Hence there are differences in social action, social choice 
between different cultures. Actors in decisionmaking arenas may form part of different 
communities (regional, national, European, political or administrative, professional/-
epistemic) and may hence be under the influence of conflicting social definitions. This tends 
to produce cognitive dissonance; learning, mutual persuasion, and change in their social 
definitions, perceptions, norms and values. Subsequently, they may become mediators in 
discourse, communication, negotiation between other actors, from different policy 
communities.  
  Summarizing, sociological institutionalism emphasizes: 
- the social embeddedness of preferences and choice 
- norm- or social frame-guided behavior as alternative to preference or interest guided 
behavior 
- social frames and ‘etiquette’ as filters for the rational pursuit and choice of action to satisfy 
preferences 
- and it also focuses the attention to the limits of rationality and the importance of chance and 
incidence, as socially defined (limited capacity, scarcity of attention, socially defined 
priorities).  
  This holds also for the communities from which actors come that are involved in the   16
transposition process: the various nation-states, the political arena, different government 
ministries and their departments, the sectors of society that they govern, the professions in 
which the policy- and decision makers have been socialized, etc.  
 
 
5.2.  Structure. The Institutional Context, as Defined by the Instrument Chosen 
 
  Let us now  apply this sociological understanding of institutions and social action to 
the topic of transposition. We found in section 4 that ‘chosen instrument’ makes quite a 
difference for the amount of delay. That is not surprising. The chosen instrument prescribes 
the legislative procedure that has to be followed to produce it. Most political decision making 
is highly stylized and framed in law, that prescribes the process that has to be followed. This 
is often overlooked or downplayed by political scientists. However, those interested in the 
role of institutions in public decision making cannot avoid paying attention to the legal rules 
of the game. With defining the legislative procedure to be followed, the chosen instrument 
also identifies which actors get involved in the process and when, what their authority is and 
capacity for intervention, what they can, but also what they cannot do, and sometimes also 
whether there is a time limit within which they have to intervene.  
  Thus the chosen instrument defines also the decision making community: specific 
civil servants, various ministerial departments, advisory councils, ministers, the cabinet, the 
queen, parliament, political parties. The legislative procedure fixes in a quite formalized 
manner the mutual expectations between the members of this decision making community. 
They know what each one’s authority is, when they have to be heard or asked for a decision, 
how long one may have to wait for them, etc. They know the different decision making rights 
of the various players: the right to determine the agenda, to be heard, to draft proposals, to 
decide, to approve, to engage in oversight.  
  Some of them can be considered ‘veto players’ - though the term ‘frustration players’ 
would be more apt, as in the end the final veto player here is the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice, which have the formal authority to overrule the veto’s of the 
domestic players in infringement procedures.  
  The legislative framework does not only define the actors and their rights, but also the 
patterns of interaction: coordination, consultation, cooperation, conflict resolution, decision 
making. Here the formal legal procedural rules are augmented by less formal institutions of 
political and administrative custom and tradition, supported by norms and values generally 
described as political and administrative culture. 
  As the number of actors involved increases, so does the likelihood that the decision 
process will take more time. And by fixing terms that certain actors have within which they 
should act the instrument also directly influences the time needed for transposition.  
  Thus, typically laws require the involvement of (several levels of) civil servants who 
write drafts, the minister, the government as a whole, all chambers of parliament, and the 
head of state (king, queen, president). In some countries advice has also be sought from a 
Council of State (Spain, Netherlands), which performs a kind of ex-ante judicial review, i.e. it 
checks on the legal soundness and the consistency with other laws; and advice may be asked 
from organizations of civil society, sometimes through formal advisory bodies such as the 
Dutch Socio-Economic Council.  
  This road is clearly a longer one than that for Orders in Council or Royal Decrees, 
where Parliament does not have to get involved (or only marginally), but usually a Council of 
State does. Ministerial Decisions can be handled by an individual minister and his civil 
servants, but they may have - or want - to consult other ministries and advisory bodies of the   17
interests concerned. In Spain the Council of State has to be asked for an opinion on all 
instruments.  
  Countries differ not only in who gets a say at what stage, but also in how frequently 
the different bodies have a chance to do so. Thus a Dutch law will pass the Cabinet at least 
twice, before and after the Council of State has been heard. And Parliament will have a first 
and second reading, a committee stage, a report stage, possibly a third reading, consideration 
of amendments, and final vote on the bill. 
  The nature of involvement may also differ. In some countries and for some 
instruments the Cabinet, Parliament, or Council of State will also be actively involved; in 
others the bill will be deposited with them, and they will have the opportunity to intervene if 
they desire to do so. Thus in Britain, a statutory instrument such as an Order in Council (of 
the Crown, the government) or a Ministerial Regulation, has to be laid before both Houses of 
Parliament. There are two forms in which this can be done, the positive or negative resolution 
procedure. If the first one is chosen by the government - according to custom when the 
statutory instrument amends an Act of Parliament - then a draft text is given and this has to be 
debated and approved, before it becomes effective. The second, negative form, implies that 
the government can choose to lay a ready-made statutory instrument in Parliament, and both 
Houses can decide to intervene and annul it. They cannot amend but only veto it. The 
instruments presented are considered by different committees. For general matters there is the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee, and for the substance by Standing Committees on 
Delegated Legislation (Vervloet 2000: 15).  
  In some countries and procedures a time limit is specified in the rules of the game 
within which the various bodies have to act. Thus the Spanish Council of State has three 
months to react, the Dutch Council of State is however not bound by any time limit. It can 
take up to six months to react, though there is a possibility for an accelerated procedure in 
emergency cases. In Spain, societal interests have at least two weeks to lobby, in practice this 
term extends to two months. Getting a statutory instrument through the British parliament 
usually takes only a few weeks. In the negative parliamentary scrutiny procedure, it has forty 
days to ‘pray against it’.   
  The British Parliament has given itself a constraint to ensure speedy decision making.  
A Bill - a draft text for a law - has to get accepted and acquire ‘Royal Ascent’ (the signature 
of the queen, elevating a Bill to an Act of Parliament) in the same Parliamentary session in 
which it got its first reading. That is, Parliament has less than a year to discuss, modify, and 
accept a draft. Otherwise it has to start all over again (Vervloet 2000: 16). This is a general 
legislative institution of the country, but it applies also to transposition, when that has to be 
done through an Act of Parliament. 
  Relations between the various actors involved will also affect transposition speed. In 
countries with a strong dualist system, disagreement between government and parliament can 
be a delaying factor. In Germany, the institutionalized rivalry between the two chambers of 
parliament, the Bundestag (usually a government majority) and the Bundesrat, in which the 
Laender are represented and which is often dominated by the party that is in opposition at the 
federal level, can be a source of blockage and delay.   
  Obviously, all these such rules of the game can and will affect the time a country 
needs for transposition. 
  As regards other rules of the game it is not always directly clear whether they speed 
up or delay decision making. Thus parliamentary scrutiny can work both ways. It can be a 
veto-player which delays, but also a monitoring agent, which chases the government, reminds 
it of its duty to transpose directives timely (as the opposition likes to use scandals to criticize 
the government ). Whenever some report emerged showing a poor transposition record of the   18
Dutch government, the opposition asked immediately questions and insisted on streamlining 
of the procedures (except in so far as that would mean a reduction of the role of parliament).  
  Typical for the British procedure is the early involvement of both Houses of 
Parliament, still during the negotiations in Brussels. Both the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords have committees (the Select Committee on European Legislation in the 
Commons and the European Union Committee in the House of Lords) that consider any EU-
document still in the drafting stage, such as draft proposals submitted to the European 
Council of the Council of Ministers, or a draft text for a Commission directive, and form an 
opinion about its consequences for British policy and law. They can forward it for further 
investigation to one of three European Standing Committees. These can draft a resolution 
regarding the European document which then are voted on on the House floor. Furthermore, 
the Commons in 1990 and the Lords in 1999 issued resolutions forbidding the government to 
agree on any proposal in the Council in Brussels before their European Committees had been 
able to form an opinion on the issue. (Vervloet 2000: 16-17) Thus Parliament de facto binds 
the hands of the negotiating British minister in the Council, limiting his room for maneuver 
considerably. This can be seen as an expression of the great distrust of the Brits as against 
Brussels and its legislative activity, and as an attempt to maintain the British supremacy of 
parliament. The counter side is that once a directive has been enacted in Brussels, the British 
parliament is not only well informed about the directive and its consequences for British law 
and policy, but has been also committed to the result, thus facilitating swift transposition even 
more.  
  Thus while Boerzel, Hoffman et al 2004 investigated whether support of EU-
membership among the general population (as measured by the Eurobarometer) played a role 
in compliance, implying that more distrust would mean more delay, the actual relation 
between distrust and delay is more complicated, more mediated. In the British case distrust 
leads to early involvement of Parliament and a limited negotiating mandate for the British 
minister, i.e. possible obstruction in the decision making phase of the directive, but quick 
transposition of an enacted directive. This only becomes apparent if one delves into the 
details of the legislative procedure.  
  It should be pointed out that the choice for an instrument is usually not a free or 
arbitrary one, but is in turn dictated by other, higher level, institutions: the principle of the 
rule of law, that in one way or another governs political and administrative choice in all our 
countries. This prescribes that government action should have a base in law, that is, in a rule 
that has been decided according to rules of democratic decision making and that should 
include an organization that has democratic legitimacy owing to periodic popular elections, 
namely a parliament.  
  If the subject of the directive is not yet regulated by any law, and if the government 
has not been given the authority by parliament to do so, transposition will require the 
enactment of a new law. This is likely to be the case in new policy areas, where a country has 
not yet much statute law, such as the privatization, liberalization, and renewed regulation of 
formerly public utilities such as public transport, telecommunications, and energy. And 
indeed, in new policy areas such as utility regulation we see that governments need to use 
more often statute law as the instrument of transposition, and on the whole this takes more 
time - even if the issue is not politicized and controversial, which it however often is. 
Furthermore, constitutional law, or the enabling law, does usually also formulate under which 
conditions transposition can be done through lower-level instruments or when statute law is 
required. The latter is usually the case if new criminal offences are created, new taxes are 
imposed, of powers are further delegated (o.a. in the UK and NL). 
  However, there can also be already statute law that authorizes the government to   19
legislate in greater detail using lower-level instruments which do not (necessarily or 
explicitly) require the involvement of the ‘legislative power’, namely parliament. This is 
more likely to be the case in old policy areas, such as food safety regulation. And indeed, 
countries like the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK have already old framework legislation 
in place in this policy area (NL: the Warenwet or Commodities Act of 1919; Germany: 
Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Lebensmitteln, Tabakerzeugnissen, kosmetischen Mitteln und 
sonstigen Bedarfsgegenständen of 1974; UK:Food Act of 1984 (Scotland Food and Drugs 
Act of 1956)). In these cases various lower-levels can decide on the transposition text: the 
Cabinet (royal decree), the minister (ministerial decision), semi-private independent 
regulatory agencies (like in the Netherlands the statutory trade associations) or even 
enforcement agencies (implementation stipulations). Thus parliament may have enacted in a 
general framework law that ‘food should be safe’ and leave it to the minister (and his 
scientific advisors) to regulate in ministerial decisions what that means in terms of detailed 
maximum concentrations of certain additives - e.g. preservatives, coloring and flavoring 
substances, vitamins - allowed in food; and the latter may subsequently have delegated 
authority to actual enforcement agencies to specify the precise sampling and analyzing 
methods to be followed during inspection in order to determine whether the subjects of 
regulation have observed the law. In case a directive specifies detailed maximum 
concentrations and sampling methods, regulations at these various levels have to be modified 
(which could take time), but that can usually be done using lower level instruments (which 
take less time). 
  In this respect the UK is a curious case. The British Parliament has enacted a broad 
European Communities Act (orig. 1972, amended 1993, 1998), authorizing the government 
to transpose European directives by using lower-level instruments such as Orders in Council 
or Ministerial Regulations (Vervloet 2000: 15). Such ‘statutory instruments’ can even be used 
to modify existing Acts of Parliaments if this is necessary for transposition, which, in the 
British case is usually a one-to-one literal transposition. As a result, Britain transposes 
usually using lower-level instruments, which tend to take less time.  
  This case points to the importance of a yet higher level of political institutions: the 
constitutional structure of the state. The willingness of the British parliament to give these 
broad powers to the government is likely to be related to the absence of dualism between the 
executive and legislative state powers in the UK. Britain has the ‘supremacy of parliament’, 
but de facto is power concentrated in the majority party, and its leader, who is not only a 
member of parliament but also prime minister and as such head of the government. 
Parliament keeps hence an indirect influence, notwithstanding the framework law, as it (or its 
majority) also forms the government. The typical British political institutions of weakness if 
not absence of checks and balances and strong centralization of power (backed by public trust 
in the state) increase the decisiveness of public authorities and the governability of the 
country, and contribute to  relatively quick transposition - and that notwithstanding the 
general distrust and even dislike of the British as regards everything that comes from 
Brussels.  
  Another higher level institution, the ‘Supremacy of Parliament’ doctrine has been 
behind the early involvement of the British parliament in the negotiation stage in Brussels. It 
was one way to regain some of this doctrine, once Britain joined the EU, and Parliament was 
de facto no longer supreme. 
  Such mechanisms fill the ‘black box’ between a general explanatory variable 
‘dualism’ or ‘checks and balances’ and transposition performance.  
  Summarizing: The differences in delay between countries can partially be explained 
by the different instrument choices - and, as argued, these are determined by legislative   20
history, policy area, and traditions and by constitutional law. Some countries can and do 
choose more often ministerial decisions, others have to use statute law or royal/presidential 
decrees. 
  However, even if we keep this variable constant and compare the transposition 
performance on the same instrument category, we will still find differences between 
countries. These can be accounted for by differences in: 
a- concrete legislative procedures linked to the same instrument in the various countries 
b- differences in discretion and room for maneuver of actors within the institutional 
framework 
c- political interests and resistance, using the institutional framework 
d- regulatory styles of law makers 
e- task and role perceptions of actors involved and differences in identity-definitions  
f- patterns of organizational differentiation and coordination within and between 
organizations (such as ministries) involved in transposition 
g- finally, also differences in the occurrence of incidents, and the paths created by significant 
incidents.  
Let us now elaborate a bit on these factors. 
 
 
5.3. Discretion 
 
  In determining the legislative procedure to be followed, the instrument defines the 
institutional context in which the actors involved in the process are embedded. And the same 
instrument category usually specifies different procedures, actors, authorities, tasks, and 
patterns of interaction. 
    Within this framework, actors usually do not only have some choice to 
influence the substance of the decision making, but they have also some discretionary 
authority to influence the time needed for decision making. Within limits they can try to 
speed it up or stretch and delay it. However, it is to be expected that the degree of discretion 
may differ by country, policy area, and ministry. The formal legislative procedures may allow 
for more or less. Thus e.g. fixed terms for reaction of a particular actor may be set Some 
formal decision making rules allow 
  Furthermore, how, in which way, and to what end they will use this discretion will 
depend on their interests, regulatory styles, task perceptions, identities, their professional 
socialization, the organizational structures within which they function, and the networks and 
epistemic communities they form part of and from which they derive their norms and values, 
which are guidelines for their actors. 
 
 
5.4. Political Interests, Resistance, Conflict 
 
  Legislation is always subject to political conflict. That is why we as political scientists 
are of course interested in it. Within the framework of the formal legislative process actors try 
to realize their interests, against the resistance of others. This should not be different with 
transposition as a legislative process. Or should it? Perhaps it should. Transposition is namely 
a rather special kind of law making: the input and output are already given. The substantial 
room for maneuver is limited. The issues have namely already been decided. Therefore, we 
would expect political conflict over the content of the transposed text to be relatively limited; 
and political resistance should not be a main reason for delay - notwithstanding what we said   21
in the introduction to this paper. In the end, it is rather senseless. Incomplete of wrongful 
transposition will eventually result in an infringement procedure for the ECJ. 
  Indeed, the indications are that delay is only rarely caused by political resistance. 
Political conflict manifests itself usually in the pre-directive phase, in the negotiations over 
the texts. And these conflicts can be fierce and long. Hence some directives are long in the 
making, five to six years are no exception. Political resistance as a source for delay is likely 
to be found only under one or more of the following conditions: 
 
a- the directive touches upon some deeply felt beliefs in the nation, such as with the biotech 
directive in Austria and some other countries; the biotech patent issue (Directive 98/44/EG) 
in the Netherlands; the liberalization of the gas- and electricity markets (infringement 
procedure against France in 2001); the services-liberalization or ‘Bolkestein directive’ 
perhaps in the future; or where the directive has enormous negative economic 
or financial consequences, as with the nitrate-directive. We do not find it often in the field of 
food safety regulation, notwithstanding the fact that food safety is a highly contested issue, 
closely related to deeply felt cultural beliefs (Van Waarden, forthcoming). For that, most food 
safety directives are too technical, or merely elaborations of earlier regulations. Wherever 
there is political conflict over transposition, it is usually for other than food safety reasons (as 
with the chocolate directive). 
 
b- where the national parliament was little or not involved in the negotiations over the 
directive, where it hence is felt that this lacks democratic legitimacy in the country 
concerned, and where parliament now tries to get in on the discussion, insufficiently realizing 
that it is too late. 
 
c- where the national government tries to add additional elements of its own to the 
instruments of transposition, which are subsequently resisted by parliament. Thus recently, 
the Dutch First Chamber of Parliament unanimously vetoed a transposed text on the 
regulation of financial products, because it did not agree with a little item that the Dutch 
government had added above what was required by the European directive. 
This implies that the chance of delay is smallest, where transposition is a literal one-on-one 
transposition of the text of the directive. The good performance of the British as regards 
transposition is considered in large part to be caused by its policy to transpose literally as 
much as possible. For that reason, the Dutch government has recently ruled that transposition 
should preferably be done one-on-one. However, as one civil servant remarked, that is a bit 
cumbersome when the directive concerns a policy that the country is newly developing, as 
with the liberalization of energy markets. It could imply that one enacts a law that shortly 
thereafter has to be changed again. 
 
The conclusion: political resistance is one explanation, but its importance is probably 
exaggerated, as politicized cases get publicity and others not. 
 
 
5.5. Regulatory Styles 
 
  Whether and how actors involved will use their discretionary authority will be 
influenced by the regulatory style they have developed in the course of time, and these can be 
specific for a certain country, a policy field, or an individual organization. There is a 
substantial literature on regulatory styles (e.g. Atkinson and Coleman (1989), Badaracco   22
1985, Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen 1985, Kelman 1981, Lundqvist 1980, Richardson 1982, 
Vogel 1986, Wilson 1985, Van Waarden 1995, 1999, Windhoff-Heritier 1989) that could 
fruitfully be applied to the topic of transposition. Two main dimensions of regulatory styles 
that have emerged from this literature are the contrast pro-active versus reactive regulatory 
style; and consensual versus adversarial style.  
  States known for a pro-active regulatory style could be expected to take active and 
early initiatives to satisfy their obligation to transpose European directives. And indeed, 
studies confirm that countries that do have such a style are relatively quick with transposition.  
The UK is a case in point. In the country, known for its quick transposition procedures, civil 
servants start the procedure already before the official proposal from the Commission    
(UK Transposition guide). Recently, the Netherlands has followed this example. Here the 
primary responsible Dutch Ministry forms a small committee of civil servants with the task to 
prepare transposition, the moment a Common Position on a draft directive has been agreed to 
in Brussels.  
  As to the dimension consensualism versus adversarialism: Holland is also known for 
a consensual policy making style. It has a long historical tradition with this, going back to the 
days of the Dutch Republic. This is done in the interest of effective, efficient, an quick 
administrative implementation and enforcement. Experience has shown that if a broad 
support base has been created in drafting legislation, less resistance is to be expected in the 
enforcement stage. Thus, though decision making - here transposition - may be a bit slower, 
actual enforcement may be quicker.  
  By contrast, an adversarial, impositional and authoritative style may be characterized 
by the opposite trade-off: relatively quick and easy decision making - read transposition - but 
at the cost of ineffective, inefficient, and slow administration and enforcement.  Northern 
European administrators (such as the civil servants we interviewed) often argue that that is 
the case in Southern European countries: a more authoritarian and impositional style, 
resulting in quick transposition on paper, but a slow and ineffective enforcement and/or many 
appeals procedures against enforcement decisions . The expectation of weak enforcement 
among the economic subjects concerned may also reduce their resistance to paper-
transposition, thus facilitating transposition even more. To determine whether these 
suspicions are not mere ‘theory’ but also empirical reality is obviously beyond the scope of 
this study. It would require that we study and compare the whole trajectory from law-in-the-
Brussels-books to the law-in-action in the streets and shops all over the five countries that we 
study.   
  A third style dimension of regulatory styles is the continuum between pragmatism and 
legalism. Is there a preference for informal procedures versus for the use of detailed formal 
procedures? Is problem solving pragmatic, or does it follow rigid principles, or is it even 
ideologically inspired? Legalistic styles are characterized by formalism, detailed regulation, 
rigid rule application, active prosecution, centralization and low discretion for lower 
administrators, while pragmatic styles are informal, flexible, and with an importance of 
means (e.g. considerations of practicality) in relation to ends, both in rule formulation and 
implementation.  
  British civil servants are according to the literature flexible in rule formulation and 
application. So are the Dutch, as can be deducted from their policy of ‘gedogen’ (tolerating a 
lesser evil in order to more effectively fight a greater evil). By contrast, German authorities 
value universal and equal rule application. Therefore, the state tends to limit the discretionary 
powers of its civil servants as regards rule interpretation. And the German legal system 
requires a strict, legalist style of policy implementation.   23
  Regulatory styles will affect transposition in two ways or on two levels. First of all, 
the will already have influenced the institutional framework, the legislative procedures and 
instruments that a country has developed and is now applying to transposition. Thus British 
pragmatism has found expression e.g. in:  
- the Parliamentary rule that a Bill introduced in Parliament has to get Royal Ascent in the 
same parliamentary session - putting pressure on parliamentary decisionmaking;  
- the agreement on a broad enabling act (European Communities Act), giving the government 
broad powers to transpose by using lower-level instruments. If one cannot change the law in 
the transposition phase any more, why bother discussing it at length in Parliament; it makes 
more sense to do so when the result can still be influenced, i.e. in the negotiating phase in 
Brussels prior to enactment of the directive.  
  German legalism forces civil servants to observe procedures more closely, to write 
detailed legislation, and hence to fit new elements, such as directives, into a plurality of 
already existing measures. Therefore, they often have to transpose a directive with a 
relatively large number of different legal instruments, including both Gesetze and 
Verordnungen. (Asser Institute 2004: 14, 20). The importance of precision produces also 
often lengthier texts than in usual in other member states. 
  Dutch consensualism has produced legislative procedures that include a phase of semi-
official consultation of the economic interests affected by transposition; In food safety the 
Ministry of Health has institutionalized this by creating a formal advisory body of the industry 
and consumers, the ‘Regulier Overleg Warenwet’ (Regular Consultation Commodity Law), 
and by giving this a place in the formal legislative procedure.  
  Secondly, regulatory styles will affect transposition, because they will influence the 
social action and choices of the politicians and civil servants involved. How will they apply 
the institutional rules, how they will interpret them, and how and to what ends they will use 
the discretionary powers they have? Thus, Dutch pragmatism (and a sense of crisis, see below) 
may induce ministers and responsible civil servants to ‘chase’ the Council of State to come 
quickly with an opinion on the text of an instrument transposing a specific directive. As said, 
the Council has to be involved, but it is not bound to react within a certain time limit. 
 
 
5.6. Task and Role Perceptions 
 
  Different actors have different tasks and responsibilities, and that will determine their 
priorities, and the (sub-)goals they will try to realize with transposition. Will they 
wholeheartedly stand behind the goal and means of the European directive and try speed up its 
transposition, or will they try to modify it to make it ‘a better piece of law’? 
  Differences in task perceptions are found first of all between Ministries as a whole. 
Thus the health minister is obviously responsible for public health and food safety, whereas 
the economics ministry is concerned about sufficient competition in the food markets and 
economic well-being of food producers. The justice ministry has the task to ensure the legal 
soundness of legislative products. These interests can be contradictory, causing delay. Thus 
the transposition of the chocolate directive (Directive 2000/36/EC from the Council and 
Parliament of June 23, 2000) was affected in the Netherlands by disagreement between the 
Health Ministry and the Foreign ministry. The first was merely concerned with food safety, 
and neutral to the controversial issue whether chocolate could also contain vegetable fats other 
than derived from cacao. The Foreign ministry, notably its Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation, wanted (as other member states like France with historical links to 
African cacao producing countries) to protect the interests of developing countries by   24
stipulating that only cacao-fat could be used. However, this led only to a conflict in the phase 
of drafting the directive in Brussels, and no longer in the transposition phase (as the minister 
had been replaced by then, see below) (see on the chocolate directive Steunenberg 2004). 
  Different interests and task perceptions can also be found within one ministry, between 
departments, and even between individual civil servants with different tasks. An interesting 
distinction that we found in our interviews is the distinction the practitioners involved in 
transposition themselves make between ‘policy lawyers’ (‘beleidsjuristen’) and ‘legislation 
lawyers’ (‘wetgevingsjuristen’). They have different perspectives on their tasks, on priorities, 
and this induces them to make different choices when they are confronted with  trade-offs 
such as between ‘quickness’ and ‘precision’ or ‘carefulness’, or between ‘solving problems’ 
and ‘enacting sound legislation, consistent with the rest of national law’.   
  The policy lawyers work in ‘policy departments’ close to the minister and identify with 
the goals and tasks of the ministry. For them, legislation is an instrument of policy making, of 
problem solving. If the goal is food safety, they will phrase and evaluate transposition texts 
from this perspective. If the goal is quick transposition, they will give that priority, and accept 
possible legal deficiencies or ‘shortcuts’ with democracy in the interest of speed. By contrast, 
‘legislative lawyers’ work in departments called ‘Legislation and Legal Affairs’ and see 
themselves as the guardians of the soundness, clarity, consistency, democratic legitimacy and 
otherwise quality of legislation. These interests will induce them to sacrifice speed, if need be.  
  From this we learn that the tasks and role perceptions are also influenced by - and can 
be manipulated through - the organizational pattern of differentiation, specialization, and 
coordination both between and within government ministries. The typical strategy to give a 
specific task priority is to create a sub-organization with that goal - and to provide it of course 
with the necessary resources, in terms of finance, personnel, information, and political access 
and standing.  
  Finally, the role perception of civil servants and politicians involved in the process is 
also influenced by the profession in which they have been trained and socialized and the 
professional networks or epistemic communities which they are part of. That differs between 
countries, and in some countries also between ministries/policy fields (e.g. Armstrong 1973). 
Typically, German civil servants have a legal training (passing legal exams is a precondition 
for higher positions in the civil service); French leading civil servants are trained in the 
Grandes Ecoles, most of which have an engineering tradition (Ecole des Mines, Ecole 
Polytechnique, ENA); British higher civil servants are trained as generalists in the liberal arts 
at Oxbridge; while the Netherlands lacks a central recruitment system and each Ministry 
recruits its own civil servants, leading to different traditions in various Ministries. This will 
influence their role perceptions as prescribed by the legislative framework within which they 
have to act. Those actors who spend many years getting socialized into legal thinking (in 
school, and on the job) will be more responsive to the need to remain within the boundaries set 
by the law, legalistic approach - if only because they know the legislative framework better. 
While those socialized in an engineering tradition are likely to make choices similar to the 
Dutch ‘policy lawyers’ mentioned above. 
 
 
5.7. Inter- and Intra-organizational Coordination 
 
  Different actors may harbor different interests, work traditionally according to 
different styles, and have different task and role perceptions.  
  Of course, transposition would go faster, the smaller the variety of interests and role 
perceptions involved, i.e. the smaller the number of actors. Typically, in the Netherlands,   25
‘policy lawyers’ are involved in the negotiations leading up to a directive, while subsequently 
different civil servants, ‘legislative lawyers’, become responsible for transposition. This is e.g. 
the case in the Economics ministry. This increases the number of actors involved, and the 
variation of perspectives. Furthermore, the ‘legislative lawyers’ new to the directive, have to 
familiarize themselves with the issue and what is precisely meant by the directive (in case the 
wording is a bit vague or ambiguous, as is often the complaint), while this knowledge was 
already present in the heads of those that did the negotiations. Where negotiation and 
transposition is done by the same persons, transposition could be faster, if only because it 
saves time. This is the case with the transposition of food safety directives by the Dutch 
Health ministry; and is also a general characteristic of British transposition. Here the basic rule 
is that transposition is done by the same civil servants that also did the negotiations in 
Brussels.  
  Where several actors are involved, transposition will be facilitated, if a) one 
actor/ministry is given the primary responsibility and the task to initiate, lead, and monitor 
progress; and b) if there is some coordinating committee, where all concerned participate, that 
organization, that regularly meets, checks progress, and where potentially a ‘culture of 
transposition’ could develop that values quick, efficient, and complete transposition. Indeed, 
most member-states have such forms of organization created, the Dutch e.g. the Inter-
departmental Committee European Regulations (ICER) that meets weekly. Such measures can 
be considered a concretization of the rather general variable ‘administrative capacity’; though 
of course more general interpretations of this (presence of professional bureaucracy ,etc.) will 
be behind the creation of such more concrete forms of ‘administrative capacity’.  
 
 
5.8. Incidents, Accidents, Chance. Limited Rationality 
 
  Most social scientific researchers have a nomothetic ambition. They are primarily 
interested in identifying regularities, in finding structural causes for phenomena, in coming up 
with generalizable statements, perhaps even ‘laws’ of social science. Thus transposition 
researchers have tried to explain compliance of member states by looking for correlations with 
structural variables. An underlying assumption thereby is that decision making is a rational 
phenomenon, that there is a logical, causal connection between some independent variable and 
compliance.  
  However, transposition is a form of history. And in history both structure and incident 
play a role. Historical processes are one the one hand driven by structural causes that exert 
long-term effects. On the other hand, within this structural context, incidents happen that can 
affect the ‘course of history’, in our case the speed of transposition.  
  Structural causes of decision making imply some form of rationality. However, from 
March’s (1988, 1994) behavioral theory of decision making we have learned that policy and 
law making are in actual practice often much less rational and systematic as it is often 
portrayed to be and as both citizens and policy makers would like to see it. 
  One constraint that March mentions is the scarcity of attention of policy makers. This 
is typically a ‘private good’: excludable and rival. Those in influential positions in legislative 
processes have many responsibilities, busy schedules, and are confronted by many demands 
from a plurality of other actors. Because of time and resource constraints they have to make 
choices where to devote their attention to, and this may shift quickly, as they are continually 
confronted by new demands on their time.  
  For political leaders, transposition is in general not a very sexy topic to devote 
attention to. Not much credit can be earned with it. It is not important for political success or   26
survival. Most issues with which European directives are concerned are often rather technical, 
and do not speak to the imagination of the public and the media. If there is political interest, 
such as in the case of biotech, biotech patenting, liberalization of the service-industries, it is 
usually critical of the directive, and a motive for delay. Apart from such cases, the public 
interest in European issues is very low. The focus is on national politics. And where the 
interest of the public and the media is, there is also the interest of politicians and their advising 
civil servants.  
  Specialized administrators may have more time to devote attention to transposition, but 
if their political supervisors do not give it priority the latter will keep the responsible 
departments short on resources, including manpower, leading to work overload and scarcity of 
attention also on the part of administrators. That is one specific interpretation of 
‘administrative capacity’, a variable mentioned in the transposition literature. Curiously 
enough, some Dutch transposition measures explicitly mention in the explanatory 
memorandum (‘Memorie van Toelichting’) accompanying the Order in Council that ‘the 
deadline could not be met for reasons of lack of administrative manpower’ (e.g.   
Warenwetbesluit Koffie- en cichorei-extracten 2001: 5).  
  However, certain events or incidents can change the priorities. These can be 
temporary, merely producing cycles of attention and inattention; but they can also become 
‘critical junctures’, causing more permanent changes. Some such incidents can and have been: 
 
a- Scandals and crises. 
Regulatory activity has frequently been intensified in reaction to crises and scandals, which 
either heightened distrust in the market, or in the government. The history of social and 
economic regulation, in particular in food safety and quality, is full of them: the US Food and 
Drug Administration was formed after 12 people died from a certain medicine; the Dutch 
dairy scandals around 1890 led to the first introduction of modern day quality controls; the 
economic crisis of the 1930s sparked the development of the French system of Appellation 
d’Origine Controlée (from 1935 on); the 1963 thalodamide scandal set the stage for the world-
wide regulation of the admission of pharmaceuticals to the market; the 1980s Austrian scandal 
of mixing ‘anti-freeze’ in their wine (to sweeten it) and the Dutch shrimp scandal (a dozen 
senior citizens dying from eating peeled shrimp) led to an overhaul of consumer protection 
regulation. The recent various animal epidemics (BSE, foot and mouth disease, pig and 
chicken pests) led to a tightening of veterinary inspections, animal feed standards and more in 
general food regulation. Similarly, crises and scandals can also increase attention to 
transposition. 
  An example is the so-called ‘Securitel’ case in the Netherlands. This was not a 
problem of transposition perse, but one of implementation and enforcement of a transposed 
directive. One directive required member states to notify the European Commission of 
technical standards that the national standardization bodies create in order that the EC would 
be able to evaluate their consequences for free trade. The directive was transposed, but actual 
implementation remained lax. One standard case - Securitel - came before the ECJ and it ruled 
that because this standard had not been notified, it was void. Societal actors could not be 
bound by it. In searching its files the government found that over 400 standards had not been 
notified, and an avalanche of liability suits threatened. It was important in that it focused legal, 
public, and political attention on the legal responsibilities the Dutch government had towards 
the Union, and the serious (financial) consequences of default.  
 
b- Temporary extra responsibility and visibility. The attention to European issues experiences 
a boom shortly before and during a country’s six months Presidency of the EU. Presidents   27
have the responsibility and inclination to blame and shame other member states as regards 
compliance, but of course they can only do so legitimately when they themselves cannot be 
reproached anything. The have to set the good example. Thus we see frantic transposition 
activity in countries shortly before they assume the Presidency. Ireland reduced its backlog in 
transposition in half, shortly before it took over the presidency in 2004. Our interviewees in 
the civil service all mentioned the importance of this event. It led to a positive cycle of 
attention and attempts to eliminate transposition backlogs, in the Netherlands in 1990, and 
again in 1997 and 2004. 
 
c- The role of individual personalities in history, and their incidental coming and going in 
decision making arenas 
That the ‘accidental presence’ of certain personalities at certain times in certain locations - and 
their disappearance e.g. murder at the ‘right time’ - influences the course of history is beyond 
doubt. The classic examples are ‘the great leaders’: Ceasar, Alexander the Great, Hitler, 
Churchill, Thatcher, Watt, Edison, Ford. But also many lesser known ones: the judges that 
decided landmark cases, the inventor of the wheel, the few voters in Florida that helped 
Geroge Bush get a majority. March (1994) has pointed out that the ‘accidental’ presence of 
certain individuals can influence decision making, and that their arbitrary entering and leaving 
of the decision making arenas contributes to the cycles of attention and the  unpredictability 
and irrationality of decision making. Social scientists on the whole do not like such 
explanations by the presence of certain individuals, but it cannot be denied that such events do 
affect the course of history. 
  This factor also influences attention to transposition requirements in member states. 
Currently, the Dutch have a minister of economic affairs with a long history in European law 
and politics, Brinkhorst. He was formerly a professor of European law, a Dutch under-minister 
of foreign affairs, a Director-General at the European Commission, and a Member of the 
European Parliament. Having this background, he is very much concerned with European 
integration, a common integrated market, and timely transposition of directives. Already in 
1978 he questioned, as a member of the Dutch parliament, the government about its 
transposition record after a study of two social scientists, Maas and Bentvelsen (19...) showed 
that the country did not perform as well as it thought it did.  
  Having this personal historical background, Brinkhorst has given high priority to 
transposition - also from his responsibility as economics minister for optimal competition. He 
has written several memos to parliament, managed the current government to give top priority 
to transposition - it now takes formally precedence over domestic legislative initiatives - and 
he is attempting to streamline the legislative procedure, trying to reduce the position of 
parliament in the transposition phase, following the British example. As yet it is uncertain 
whether he will succeed; and ... how long he still will be minister. His entry, or rather, that of 
his small party of left-liberals D’66,  into the government is somewhat of an accident; and so 
could his disappearance be. His party is small, and dwindling. 
  Brinkhorst is a case of influence of individuals on te process of transposition in 
general; other ‘personal accidents’ may affect specific directives. March (1994) has made the 
curious observation that, as specific actors come and go in decision making arenas, they may 
fiercely lobby for or against a decision, but once it is taken they loose interest in its actual 
implementation and enforcement. These and similar observations form the basis of his 
‘garbage can model’ of decision making.  
  Such incidents can also be found around transposition decisions. The Dutch ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (its development aid department) resisted at first quite fiercely the draft 
chocolate directive, but eventually acquiesced in the decision, and showed no interest   28
whatsoever any more in the transposition phase. The reason: From 1994-98 the leftist socialist 
Jan Pronk, with a long-time history of involvement in (UN) development issues, was minister 
of development aid, and wanted to protect the interests of the cacao-producing African 
countries. He intervened repeatedly and made the Dutch government side with France, 
Belgium and Luxemburg in resisting allowing other vegetable fats in the chocolate preparation 
process. By the time the directive was enacted, in 2000, he had however left (though the same 
coalition was still governing) and taken up a new job with a UN organization (Steunenberg 
2004). 
 
d- Just as the accidental entry and exit of certain individuals with a specific history affects 
delays in transposition, so does the entry and exit of governments. The accidental change of 
government - twice within a period 90 days - delayed the Dutch transposition of the chocolate 
directive. Political uncertainty hence does not only affect the continuity of domestic policy, 
but also of the transposition of European directives. 
 
  Of course, there is a relation - one could speak of a dialectic - between structure and 
incident. If less rational factors affecting transposition would be purely incidental, one would 
expect them to be randomly distributed across countries, and hence in the long run not to 
affect transposition. However, such is obviously not the case. This points to the fact that the 
occurrence, and importance, of specific events is influenced by structural factors: a 
parliamentary political system with a proportional representation electoral system, making 
coalition governments necessary, produces less stable governments, so that the entry and exit 
of governments and individual ministers will exert more influence on transposition; and a 
legalistic culture, and a structural importance of lawyers in the public administration, can 
make a government more sensitive to scandals such as Securitel. 
  Conversely, incidents and accidents can be critical junctures, which induce change, 
e.g. a modification of the legislative procedures, that is, the institutional framework for 
transposition. Even if the change is minimal, its long-term effects can be significant. The event 
can cause a change the path of development, spark a minor change that can subsequently 
structure further choices in a different direction. The creation of the American FDA following 
a drug scandal, was originally a minor change. But once an organization was created for this 
task, it set a new train in motion: a train of internal organizational development, amplified by 
further additions of tasks and resources by external actors. The current FDA is incomparable 
to the original one. It is a bit as with chaos theory: the proverbial butterfly in that causes a 
storm on the other side of the globe. Crises can cause hypes, complaints about poor 
transposition can get parroted in the media and among policy makers, and before one knows it, 
they induce institutional change. 
 
 
6. Policy Learning 
 
  Thus incidents and accidents, that give transposition temporary priority, can give rise 
to policy learning. This seems to be indeed the case. The legislative procedures for 
transposition have been modified over time in different countries, new actors have been 
created with the responsibility to monitor transposition progress, procedures have been 
streamlined, gradually routines are developed and modified. As transposition become more of 
a routine activity - and this increases with the amount of directives to be transposed - it goes 
quicker, resulting in a decline of delays.   29
  That is what our data indeed show, a learning and routinization effect. The average 
delay has gradually decreased over the years. In the 1960’s and 1970’s the average delay was 
221 days, whereas in the period 2000 until 2004 on average there are no delays; transposition 
happens even 2 months before the deadline. (Table 7) 
 
Table 7. Delays over time* 
  Mean delay in days N 
1960-1969  221  7 
1970-1979   221  102 
1980-1989   303  180 
1990-1999   68  286 
2000-2004  -59  139 
Average / Total  151  714 
Source: Own data 
* After correcting for outlying cases (See Annex 2) 
 
This positive development can be observed in all five countries under investigation. However, 
there are differences in the extent of the improvements. The Netherlands, the UK and Greece 
have moved from average delays of about a year at the beginning of their membership to the 
average transposition happening well in advance before the deadline (Figure 5). Spain has also 
improved its transposition speed, but the mean delay remains in positive numbers: 28 days. 
Germany does not really show an improvement concerning the transposition delays. In 1970’s 
its average delay was 138 days and in this millennium it is still 111 days. 
 
Figure 5. Mean delay in days over time in the member states* 
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Source: Own data 
* After correcting for outlying cases (See Annex 2, Figure 6)   30
 
Of course, the European Commission can and has tried to influence the attention member 
states give to transposition, and to make them develop more efficient routines. It does so by 
regularly publishing the scoreboard - which is a benchmarking instrument for the member 
states - and by initiating infringement procedures against them when they fail to comply. 
Furthermore, learning is of course a result of the increase in the frequency of need for 
transposition. However, domestic incidents like scandals and personalities have also affected 
the streamlining of legislative processes and the development of new standard operating 
procedures. In doing so it even tends to affect the normal domestic legislative procedures. 
Indeed, quiet a special case of ‘Europeanization’ of national institutions. 
  Two cases of learning and streamlining of procedures: NL and Britain ... NL: new 
institutions, procedural rules created: the Aanwijzingen voor de Regelgeving (Ar). ...Learning 
from others: DK, UK; negatively, from France ... 
 
 
7. Conclusion:  
 
  In this paper we have presented some data on transposition delays, and have developed 
a model for explaining the differences in delay between member states. Many factors 
contribute to transposition delays. Method-purists will probably object that this model leads to 
an enormous over-determination. That may be so, but that it in the nature of the reality of 
transposition. It does not help or do justice to the subject to try to find one holy grail, one 
variable that explains all, because it does not exist. All attempts to far show that quantitative 
correlations can only explain a very minor part of the variance. This calls for a need to really 
understand the processes involved in transposition, to get into the black box of transposition 
decision making.  
  We have done so by considering transposition as a special kind of national legislation: 
where the input and expected output is the same for all member states, but where the 
throughput can differ, resulting in temporal output differences, namely delays beyond the 
deadline of the directive. This special kind of national legislative decision is, like all 
legislation, influenced by the formal institutional framework, the legislative procedures 
specified for certain legislative instruments. We see this framework from the perspective of 
sociological institutionalism: Actors function according to, in and interpret and modify this 
institutional framework. The may have more or less discretion for interpretation, and where 
they do, their interests, and task and role perceptions will affect the process. We have also 
focused on the less rational elements in these decision making processes: scarcity of attention, 
cycles in priorities, and the influence of incidents and accidents. In the end, a dialectic 
between structure and event also influences transposition - like any form of history. But in this 
dialectic, actors learn, and new routines or standard operating procedures emerge, that 
contribute to a reduction of transposition delays over time. 
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APPENDIX I. INFORMATION ON THE DATA 
 
Table 8. Number of Directives that needed to be transposed before 01.02.2004 
Country     N 
Yes  181 Netherlands 
   Unknown*  28
Yes  181 Germany 
   Unknown*  28
Yes  171 UK 
   Unknown*  21
Yes  106 Spain 
   Unknown*  12
Yes  127 Greece 
   Unknown*  19
Yes  766
Unknown  108
Total 
Total  874
Source: Own data 
*Unknown – the deadline for these directives is unknown. No such information is stated in the 
directive, or in the CELEX, Commission documents or literature. 
 
 
Table 9. Completeness of the information on national transposition measures in Celex 
  
N  Percent 
Complete  570  74,4
Incomplete  31  4,0
No reference  165  21,5
Total  766  100,0
Source: Own data 
 
 
Table 10. Completeness of Reference. National instrument in our possession 
   N  Percent 
Complete reference + 
possession  685 78.4
Complete reference 
+not possession  41 4.7
Incomplete reference 
17 1.9
National measure 
adopted after 1.2.2004  4 .5
No reference 
127 14.5
Total  874 100.0
Source: Own data 
 
   36
ANNEX II. DISTRIBUTION AND OUTLIERS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
‘DELAY’ 
 
The dependent variable ‘delays in transposition’ is not normally distributed. It is positively 
kurtosed (Table 10). 
 
Table 11. Distribution of variable ‘delay’ 
  
Data 
including 
outliers 
Data excluding 
outliers 
Mean  207,47 123,27
Std. Deviation  668,963 307,082 
Minimum  -6528 -639
Maximum  3641 961
Skewness  ,088 ,607
Kurtosis  22,589 ,310
Source: Own data 
 
A number of extreme outliers cause this problem. One of the ways of dealing with correctly 
measured outliers is to exclude them from the analysis (Figure 5). In order to see the effect of 
the excluded cases, the following analysis will be done twice – once with the outliers and 
other without. 
 
Figure 6. Outliers 
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The first outlier above zero is case number 63 that has a value of 1008 days. Thus, all cases 
having delay of 1008 or more are removed. The first outlier under zero is case number 631 
that has a value of -691 days (a national instrument was adopted 691 before the deadline). All 
cases having this value or more are removed. Interesting to note is that 80 percent of outliers 
concern directives adopted before 1990. 
  Table 12 shows the outlier distribution per country. Germany has the highest number 
of outliers – 20 forming 38.5 percent of all outliers. The Netherlands has 11 outlying cases and 
Greece -10, UK – 8, and Spain only 3 outlying cases. 
 
Table 12. Outliers per country 
  
N  Percent 
Netherlands  11  21,2
Germany  20  38,5
UK  8  15,4
Spain  3  5,8
Greece  10  19,2
Total  52  100,0
Source: Own data 
 
Now that the outliers are removed, the average delay has changed. Table 11. above 
demonstrates that it has decreased from 207.47 to 123.27 days. The range now is 1600 days 
instead of 10169 days, and kurtosis has obtained an acceptable value. If we would have 
included the outliers in the tables presented in the paper text the results would have been a bit 
different. In table 13 we include by way of example what table 1would have looked like with 
outliers included.  
 
Table 13. Transposition on or over time (Outliers included) 
  
N  Percent 
   Delayed  434 56,7
   Precisely 
on time  1 ,1
  
Too early  246 32,1
   Total  681 88,9
Missing  System*  85 11,1
Total  766 100,0
Source: Own data 
* Information missing on whether the deadline of a directive or on the national transposition measure. 
 
Figure 7 shows that the extreme outliers are located in the early years of transposition.  
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Figure 7.   Mean delays in days in a country over time (outliers included) 
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APPENDIX III. Hypotheses and their results in quantitative studies on transposition,  
implementation, or compliance with EU law 
 
I- Confirmed 
 
 Hypothesis  Operationalisation  Expected 
result on 
complianc
e 
Authors 
1 Comparative 
economic 
power 
Percentage of the raw total of GNP of all EU 
partners for each country for each year 
Positive (Mbaye 
2001) 
2 Regional 
autonomy 
Regional autonomy index (Hooghe and Marks 
2000) 
Negative (Mbaye 
2001) 
3 Administrative 
capacity/ 
government 
effectiveness 
Administrative constraints (capacity): 
1. Current receipts of the government for each year 
as a percentage of GDP (Cusack 1991) 
2. Scale that tracks the professionalism of the 
bureaucracy, using the statutory construction of the 
civil service  (performance-related pay (+), 
permanent tenure (-), public announcement of 
vacancies (+))  (Auer et al 1996 (Does not vary 
over time)) 
3. Corruption index (Center for Corruption 
Research 2001) 
Positive (Mbaye 
2001) 
   financial resources →GDP per capita, share of tax 
revenue in GDP, (GDP per capita →World Bank’s 
‘World Development Indicator’); human resources: 
quantitative: share of public spending on civil 
servants in GDP, share of civil servants on working 
population; qualitative: higher education of civil 
servants in years: average length of higher 
education of the population over the age of 20 in 
years of a country, bureaucratic efficiency 
(spending on civil servants →Cusack, education 
level  →Barro and Lee, bureaucracy effectiveness 
and professionalism →Mbaye) 
Positive (Borzel, 
Hofmann 
et al. 
2004) 
    Government ability: the government effectiveness 
indicators developed by Kaufman, Klaay and 
Mastruzzi, published by the World Bank 
Positive (Sverdrup 
2004) 
4 Stable  and 
efficient 
political 
institutions 
Preconditions of efficacy: Type of parliamentary 
chambers, position of the head of state, type of 
government coalition, institutional autonomy of 
regions; Government efficacy: number of parties in 
parliament, number of parties in government, 
effective number of parties score, government 
support in parliament, party government efficacy 
score;  Stability of government: polarisation, 
volatility of voter support; irregular changes of the 
government; government durability. Source: 
indexes, comparative literature. 
Positive (Lampine
n and 
Uusikylд 
1998) 
5 Political  culture 
in the member 
states 
Legitimisation: electoral participation, satisfaction 
with democracy; Social cleavages: social 
fragmentation, protest score; Individual values and 
autonomy: post-material values, individual 
autonomy, trust by other EU citizens. Source – 
indexes and comparative literature. 
Positive (Lampine
n and 
Uusikylд 
1998)   40
6  Rule of law  Opinion pool data by James L. Gibson  Positive  (Borzel, 
Hofmann 
et al. 
2004) 
    ‘Rule of law’ index by Kaufman, Klaay and 
Mastruzzi, published by the World Bank 
Positive (Sverdrup 
2004) 
7 Type  of 
national legal 
measure used 
Statutes, orders in council, ministerial regulations – 
from national instrument 
Statutes 
take more 
time than 
Orders in 
Council 
and 
Ministerial 
regulations 
(Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
8 Quality  (1)  and 
politicisation 
(2) of a 
directive 
Commission directives vs. Council directives that 
are assumed to have less quality and are more 
politicised. 
1-Positive/ 
2-negative 
(Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
9 Length  of 
deadline 
Calculated from information in Celex and texts of 
directives 
Negative (Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
10  Goodness of fit 
between EU 
and national 
polices 
New national instrument= low level of fit, 
amendment= good fit 
 
Positive (Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
11 Organisation  of 
the executive 
Ad hoc ministry yes, no, mixed; actual role of the 
Foreign Office in the organisation of EU affairs 
(central, mediated); executive organization 
(Kassim, Peters et al. 2000) 
Positive, if 
organisatio
nally the 
EU issues 
has 
achieved 
sufficient 
autonomy 
from 
transitional 
foreign 
policy  
(Giuliani 
2004) 
12 Involvement  of 
parliament in 
EU affairs 
Parliament’s rights concerning: 
- information 
- meetings 
- impact on policy ECPRD (2002); Katz and 
Wessels (1999) 
Positive (Giuliani 
2004) 
13 National 
coordination 
capacity 
National coordination: low, middle, high depending 
on ambitions and style adopted by the MS in 
coordinating all the policy-actors at the national 
level (Kassim, Peters et al. 2000; Kassim 2003) 
Positive (Giuliani 
2004) 
14 Coordination  at 
the EU level 
Coordination capacity recorded at Brussels level 1-
low, 2-medium; 3-high (Kassim, Peters et al. 2000) 
Positive (Giuliani 
2004)   41
 
 
II- Confirmed, but weak explanatory power or variable 
explains very small part of variation 
 
 Hypothesis  Operationalisation  Expected 
result on 
complianc
e 
Authors 
1 Number  of 
national veto 
players* 
Parties belonging to the government coalition (in 
the case of Germany also the Bundesrat when ruled 
by a different majority from that supporting the 
executive) – according to rules proposed by 
Tsebelis. 
Negative (Giuliani 
2003) 
2 Political  and 
economic 
power of state 
Power: gross domestic product, total population, 
size of the armed forces, proportion of votes in the 
Council, contributions to the EU budget 
Negative (Borzel, 
Hofmann 
et al. 
2004) 
3  Support of EU  Support of institutions: support of the membership 
of one’s own country in the EU, + confidence in the 
European institutions - data from Eurobarometer 
surveys. No annual data available. 
Positive (Borzel, 
Hofmann 
et al. 
2004) 
4 Organisational 
differences 
between 
involved 
national 
ministries 
 Negative  (Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
5 Inter-
ministerial 
coordination 
problems 
 Negative  (Mastenbr
oek 2003) 
6 Policy style 
exhibited by a 
member state 
(anticipatory 
vs. reactive) 
 Kassim et al (2001); Kassim (2003); Van Waarden 
(1999) 
Positive. 
Performan
ce is better 
if a 
member 
state 
exhibits 
anticipator
y policy 
style 
(Giuliani 
2004) 
 
III- Not confirmed 
 
 Hypothesis  Operationalisation Expected 
result on 
complianc
e 
Authors 
1 Number  of 
national veto 
players* 
veto players → institutional and partisan- veto 
player index by Beck et al. (2001) 
Negative (Borzel, 
Hofmann et 
al. 2004) 
    The number of governments, the number of 
coalition partners in a government, ideological 
score of each coalition partner etc. Tsebelis 
website 
Negative (Mbaye 
2001)   42
2 Level  of 
corporatism 
Preconditions: degree of unionisation, moderate 
left support; Degree of corporatism: 
consociationalism, corporatism 
Positive (Lampinen 
and 
Uusikylд 
1998) 
    The economy’s level of integration (functional 
roles of social partners, not relying on structural 
factors) - Siaroff 1999 (per year for all countries) 
Positive (Mbaye 
2001) 
3 Bargaining 
power in the 
Council** 
Weighted votes of member states in the Council - 
Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997 
Positive (Mbaye 
2001) 
4 Degree  of 
consensual 
democracy 
Effective number of parties (Laakso and 
Taagepera index),  the percentage of time during 
which one-party or minimum-winnig 
governments have ruled, the duration of the 
executives, the electoral disproportionality 
(Gallagher index), the degree of pluralism in the 
representation of interests (Siaroff 1999), the 
indexes of federalism, bicameralism, 
constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and central 
banks’ independence (Lijphart 1999) 
Positive (Giuliani 
2003) 
5 Citizens’ 
support for the 
EU*** 
Confidence in the EU: trust on the future of the 
EU, abolition of inner borders; confidence in the 
EU Council, European Parliament, and the 
Commission;  satisfaction with the EU: EU 
membership, democracy in the EU, national 
benefits have been gained, national influence, 
citizens’ say on EU matters, citizens’ attachment 
to the EU 
Positive (Lampinen 
and 
Uusikylд 
1998) 
   Eurobarometer  data  Positive  (Mbaye 
2001) 
6 Approval  of 
democracy 
Eurobarometer data  Positive  (Mbaye 
2001) 
7 Number  of 
instruments 
used for 
transposition 
Data from Quarterly of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the list of measures notified to the 
Commission, the Asser Institute’s list, and 
Opmaat. 
Negative (Masten-
broek 2003) 
8 New  directive 
(as opposed to 
amendments) 
Text of directive  Negative  (Masten 
broek 2003) 
9  Use of QMV  Dichotomous  variable  (unanimous  voting  norm, 
before 1986, thereafter QMV) 
Negative (Mbaye 
2001) 
10 Dimension  and 
organisation of 
national PR in 
Brussels 
Composition of PR in numerical terms - IDEA 
Database; Vachers (2000); Eurostat 
Positive (Giuliani 
2004) 
11 Length  of 
membership 
Natural log of each state’s length of membership)  Negative/ 
positive 
(Mbaye 
2001) 
* Variable ‘number of veto players’ has been tested in three quantitative studies, and only one of them 
showed the expected result, although explaining small amount of variance. In the rest of the studies, 
the hypothesis was not confirmed. 
** The analysis showed significant negative correlation. 
*** The author even found a strong negative correlation. 
 